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SEEKING SOLID SUBJECTIVITY  
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IN JEANETTE WINTERSON’S GUT SyMMETRIES
Abstract
The present paper intends to closely explore the process of identity formation in the 
characters of Jeanette Winterson’s novel Gut Symmetries in light of Catherine Mala-
bou’s notions of plasticity, destructive plasticity or trauma, and trans-subjectivation. 
Identity as an inconsistent procedure of becoming would be intensely explicated in 
Gut Symmetries through the viewpoint of the characters, in particular Alice. Identity 
as a mere space or crack, which constantly provides the opportunity for the subject to 
observe himself/herself, could be introduced as Catherine Malabou’s notion of plas-
ticity of the subjectivity or trans-subjectivation in the novel. The juxtaposition of the 
pliability of quantum physics and trans-subjectivity in the novel would be highlighted 
to emphasize that presence, time, identity, and even being could be nothing other 
than plasticity or ever-fluctuating matter and non-matter. Plasticity as the absolute 
nucleus of existence, identity, and love would be manifested as perceptible in the form 
of trans-subjectivity. Sadism as a form of destructive plasticity would be spotlighted as 
the death drive in the novel and it corroborates the plasticity of love, which could be 
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transformed into hate. Spotlighting femininity as essenceless, Alice and Stella would 
be represented as the instances of femininity that is mutable and erratic.
Keywords: corporeality, destructive plasticity (trauma), plasticity, sadism, tempo-
rality, trans-subjectivation, Jeanette Winterson, Gut Symmetries.
Introduction
Broadly accredited as one of the most noteworthy British writers, Jeanette 
Winterson’s works demonstrate flitting in time, deconstructing the concept of 
space and undoing the deterministic and bounded notion of identity. Owing to 
her reputation as one of the most original voices of the 1980s, to her stunning 
style and narrative, she was named one of the 20 Best of Young British Writers 
by the literary magazine Granta. Winterson’s obscurant spectacle on the per-
ception of love and gender shies away from the conventional and anticipated 
narratives of her time on infatuation and sexual category and dislodges the ac-
knowledged cultural conventions.
As an audacious and provocative novelist, Winterson passionately parallels 
two inner and outer quests for destination and lime lights that a dominant clo-
sure in this pursuit could never be gained. In Gut Symmetries, Winterson ex-
plores the affinity between physics and human identity formation via the sym-
metries of the Grand Unified Theories (Gut) in quantum physics and cosmology. 
Putting time and subjectivation adjacent, Winterson distorts the boundaries of 
subjectivation via expressing trans-subjectivation as always-already occurred in 
the subjects. 
The present paper first provides the literature review on Gut Symmetries. 
Then, the Malabouean critical concepts of destructive plasticity, plasticity, and 
trans-subjectivation shall be presented. Consequently, the core section of the 
study will be presented as “The Plasticity of Presence and Trans-Subjectivity” 
and “The Quantum Physics of the Physique: The Plasticity of Corporeality.” Fi-
nally, the findings of the research will be addressed in the concluding section.
Literature Review
Several scholarly articles, dissertations, and researches have been published 
on Winterson’s Gut Symmetries; yet this work has not been analyzed through 
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Catherine Malabou’s perspective. The researches have been mainly focused on 
narration, intertextuality, and femininity to maneuver over Winterson’s writing 
style. The interwoven notions of creation and writing have been lime‐lighted in 
some research works as well. 
Emphasizing the close affinity between one’s brain and identity, Annemarie 
Estor in Jeanette Winterson’s Enchanted Science asserts that “in her treatment of 
‘self ’. . . in Gut Symmetries, where the traditional notion of ‘self ’ as a coherent 
entity dissolves . . . Stella describes how her self is dispersed through time” (77). 
She continues that “[e]ven the most intimate knowledge, the knowledge of one’s 
own being, one’s own identity, is lost in confusion” (78). Estor juxtaposes the 
concepts of “fragmentation” and “prophetic certainty” in her book and elabo-
rates on the common features of the characters in Winterson’s novels. 
Ann McClellan has juxtaposed British female scientists and female char-
acters of Gut Symmetries in “Science Fictions: British Women Scientists and 
Jeanette Winterson’s Gut Symmetries.” She claims that the “feminized view of 
science and the postmodern world” (1057) represented in Winterson’s novel 
places her among outstanding writers of the time. Moreover, the amalgamation 
of alchemy, physics, Jewish Kabbalah, Tarot, and Superstring Theory provides 
a feminine realm of narration in which femininity manifests itself in spiritual 
understanding of the cosmos. 
Diane Leblond in “Visual Pragmatics of Intertextuality: Ghosts from Won-
derland in Jeanette Winterson’s Gut Symmetries” puts emphasis on intertextual-
ity in Winterson’s text. She presupposes that “in their visual liminality and stub-
born reluctance to signify, intertextual creatures remind us that meaning is not 
within the sign, but emerges in the provisional, possibly infelicitous interaction 
between linguistic entities” (Leblond 1309). Expressing intertextuality as a type 
of hunting, Leblond focuses on the verbal and visual items in Winterson’s novel. 
Theoretical Framework: Critical Concepts
1. Destructive Plasticity (Trauma)
Catherine Malabou in her The Ontology of the Accident redefines trauma 
through the perspective of neuroscience and elaborates that the transformation 
of identity after an extreme strain first manifests itself in the brain and then its 
implications could be visible. “Destructive plasticity enables the appearance or 
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formation of alterity where the other is absolutely lacking” (Malabou, The On-
tology of the Accident 11) and “by contrast, the flight identity forged by destruc-
tive plasticity flees itself first and foremost” (Malabou, The Ontology of the Ac-
cident 12). She emphasizes the philosophical aspect of trauma and asserts that 
“what destructive plasticity invites us to consider is the suffering caused by an 
absence of suffering, in the emergence of a new form of being, a stranger to the 
one before” (Malabou, The Ontology of the Accident 18). She further develops 
her unique view of trauma as destructive plasticity by asserting that “even if the 
destructive and disorganizing explosive power is present virtually in each of us, 
ready to manifest itself, to take body or self-actualize at any moment, it has nev-
er received a name in any field whatsoever” (Malabou, The Ontology of the Acci-
dent 5). She refers to the phenomena of coldness and indifference as the “char-
acteristics of destructive plasticity, of this power of change without redemption, 
without teleology, without any meaning other than strangeness” (Malabou, The 
Ontology of the Accident 24). In Malabouean standpoint, trauma or destructive 
plasticity equals the transformation or mutation of body into another body and 
hence, another identity absolutely diverse from the previous one.
2. Plasticity
As the core argument of Catherine Malabou, neurobiology has offered an 
innovative standpoint on subjectivity. Borrowing the notion of plasticity from 
neurologists, Malabou claims that she has encountered “another plasticity” or 
the philosophical definition of plasticity for the first time in Hegel’s classifica-
tion of the subject in the process of subjectivation. Considering Hegel’s formu-
lation of the modern nature of human subjectivity, Malabou presupposes that 
he applies it to divine subjectivity. In The Future of Hegel, Malabou asserts that, 
in Hegelian view, the process of representation “seals into one the divine ke-
nosis and the kenosis of the transcendental subject” (112). It could be assert-
ed that Hegel’s human and divine subjectivities benefit from similar reading as 
self-othering and kenotic. Elaborating on the issue of divine alienation as the 
demonstration of temporalization, Malabou asserts that “each persona consists 
of a progressive alienation that is not a manifestation of a lack but the appear-
ance of a new ontological guise of time” (The Future of Hegel 113). Spotlighting 
temporalization as a linear becoming of an event or the incarnation, Malabou 
opens up a new vision on the Hegelian notion of the divine subject and carries 
on that “God envisages himself as a moment” (The Future of Hegel 119), a vital 
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one, which has to be passed. Maintaining the subject’s kenotic alienation simi-
lar to God’s, Hegel’s theoretical interpretation of Christianity lays plasticity into 
the core definition of the human subject. According to Clayton Crockett in the 
foreword of Malabou’s Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, the subject 
sees himself as a moment of time in which he is a part, a manifestation of 
temporalization that achieves the fulfillment of his essence in history even as 
it ends. The plasticity of temporal subjectivity relaunches or drives the dialec-
tic forward and beyond itself even as it cancels itself out as it progresses. (xii)
Reconciling neurology and Hegelian philosophy, Malabou elucidates that 
their divergence is not radical as plasticity in both perspectives stands for a cer-
tain sort of organization. In either the system of absolute knowledge/subjec-
tivity or the nervous system, plasticity, in Malabouean view, serves as the same 
functioning and provides the same being and economy.
3. Trans-Subjectivation
In “A Conversation with Catherine Malabou,” by Noelle Vahanian, Malabou 
gives details of trans-subjectivation and reveals that the subject “trans-sub-
jects itself constantly” (4); however, “trans-subjectivation does not mean that 
you become different from what you used to be” (5). Delineating the notion of 
trans-subjectivation, Malabou throws light upon the issue that in trans-subjec-
tivation absorbing the other’s diversity could be unattainable as well. Illuminat-
ing the presence of a space within oneself between two forms of self, Malabou 
claims that trans-subjectivation is the experience of two opposing forms of self 
within oneself. 
Defining it as a journey within oneself, Malabou affirms that plasticity and 
trans-subjectivation could be two sides of the same coin. Consequently, Mala-
bou’s notion of plastic self could bring about a political and an emancipatory 
outcome as the plastic subject is capable of transforming its way of being. In 
What Should We Do with Our Brain?, Malabou intertwines the concepts of sub-
jectivity and plasticity and states that “between the upsurge and the explosion 
of form, subjectivity issues the plastic challenge” (82). In other words, Mala-
bou argues that in the journey from self to self, the distance between self and 
self could be considered as the product of transformation, which she names 
trans-subjectivation. 
Hoda NikNezHad‐Ferdos, Bakhtiar sadjadi: seekiNg solid suBjectivity versus spottiNg...
130
Investigating Gut Symmetries: A Malabouean Reading
1. The Plasticity of Presence and Trans-Subjectivity
The present section aims to meticulously analyze the plasticity of presence 
and identity via the plasticity of quantum physics including time and matter. 
The GUT or the Grand Unified Theory would be expressed as the plasticity 
theory, which could be capable of explicating the ever-mutable nature of matter, 
identity, and time. Moreover, the Tarot as the volatility of chance in life would 
be lime lighted due to the focus of Jeanette Winterson on the issues of possibility 
and probability entitling each chapter according to one card in tarot. The pro-
cess of trans-subjectivation as the discovery of an observant crack inside would 
be illustrated and the contradiction in quantum physics and trans-subjectiva-
tion would be juxtaposed. 
Commencing with the title Gut Symmetries, it could be delineated that 
through the word GUT, which stands for Grand Unified Theory or the theo-
ry of everything, Winterson juxtaposes this issue with Gut as in Gut feelings. 
Spotlighting the plasticity of quantum physics and even matter, the narrator en-
deavors to do away with solid and stable facts of science and portray more svelte 
notions of identity and love. On her website, Jeanette Winterson explicates that
[i]t’s a play on words. GUT stands for Grand Unified Theory – the theory 
of everything science wants to discover – and it’s Gut as in Gut instinct, 
the feelings that lead us on much more than we like to admit. Symmetries, 
well, it’s the search for a perfect parallel universe, the one just like ours but 
without the problems. I suppose that’s what we look for when we fall in 
love. (“Gut Symmetries”)
Titled “The Fool,” the first chapter of Gut Symmetries introduces the card 
zero of the deck to emphasize the element of the unknown. However, it might 
be asserted that the ship of fools could refer to “a medieval conceit. Lunatics/
saints sailing after that which cannot be found” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 3). 
The physicist Alice, who is the protagonist of the novel, connects the concept of 
becoming with the notion of being and claims that the Greeks were concerned 
with “physis, that is, nature, the nature of things; spirit, man, the observable 
world, the heavenly bodies” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 5). Bringing Heraclitus 
on the stage, Alice puts more emphasis on “eternal becoming, flux not fix, and 
identity of perpetual change, process not substance” (Winterson, Gut Symme-
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tries 5). Presupposing that “becoming was challenged by being” (Winterson, 
Gut Symmetries 5) by Parmenides, Alice explicates that “unalterable Being and 
perpetual Becoming could not be reconciled” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 5). 
Claiming that quantum physics has abolished the security of “the mechanistic, 
deterministic, mind/matter of cosmic reality,” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 11), 
Alice believes that Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity was the inauguration of 
Quantum physics. 
Delving into the issue of selfhood and subjectivity, Alice asserts that “I can-
not tell you who I am unless I tell you why I am” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 6). 
Confirming the plasticity of both reality and truth, Alice claims that “what I call 
light is my own blend of darkness. What I call a view is my hand-painted trom-
pe-l’oeil” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 6). Struggling to find a definition of iden-
tity, Alice thinks that the self is always-already split: “I am civilised but my needs 
are not. What is it that lashed in the darkness?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 
6). Elaborating on the issues of image and the affinity between the image of the 
subject and the subject, Alice brings identity and subjectivation into question: 
What or who? I cannot name myself. The alchemists worked with a magic 
mirror, using reflection to guide them. The hall of mirrors set around me 
has been angled to distort. Is that me in the shop-glass/ is that me in the 
family photo? Is that me in the office window? Is that me in the silver 
pages of a magazine? Is that me in the broken bottles on the street? Every-
where I go, reflection. Everywhere a caught image of who I am. In all of 
that who am I? (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 6)
In What Should We Do with Our Brain?, Catherine Malabou merges the con-
cepts of plasticity and reflection and argues that plasticity “far from producing 
a mirror image of the world, is the form of another possible world. To produce 
a consciousness of the brain thus demands that we defend a biological alterglo-
balism” (80). In other words, Malabou, in the above-mentioned book, observes 
self and subjectivity as the reflection of the brain activity as “the brain makes 
possible the fundamental organic coherence of our personality, our self. The self 
is the result, the reflection, of the ordered functioning of the neuronal networks 
comprising the brain” (What Should We Do with Our Brain? xiv). Being sentient 
of the plasticity of the brain as the outburst of identity, Malabou distinguishes 
the aloofness of plasticity from flexibility. 
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In the foreword of Catherine Malabou’s What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 
Marc Jeannerod further points out that
[w]e clearly have no consciousness of the plastic mechanisms forming 
our personality and guaranteeing its continuity. Yet by trying to become 
conscious of them we may, Malabou proposes, acquire a new freedom, 
that of imposing our own organization on the world rather than submit-
ting to the influences of a milieu. Plasticity, in effect, is not flexibility. Let 
us not forget that plasticity is a mechanism for adapting, while flexibility 
is a mechanism for submitting. Adapting is not submitting, and, in this 
sense, plasticity ought not to serve as an alibi for submitting to the new 
world order being dreamed up by capitalism. To be conscious of the plas-
ticity of one’s brain is to give oneself the means to say no. (xiv)
Mulling over the notions of identity and subjectivation, Alice crystallizes the 
plasticity of identity and mutable selfhood as she asserts that “I could not de-
fine myself in relation to the shifting poles of certainty that seemed so reliable” 
(Winterson, Gut Symmetries 7). Observing herself and the other of herself as 
the opposite of the former, Alice claims that trans-subjectivation includes mon-
itoring of at least three phases of the subjectivity. Seeing herself as a trans-sub-
ject, Alice depicts herself as “I was a glove turned inside-out, softness showing” 
(Winterson, Gut Symmetries 7). In other words, it could be argued that plasticity 
per se would be the presence of being for Being. In Malabouean perspective, 
trans-subjectivation refers to the plasticity of being and identity providing a 
realm in which the subject is capable of opening a space from which the self and 
the other of the self are recognizable. The crack in the I could endow the op-
portunity of multiple perspective of the subject from itself. The image of a glove 
turned inside-out as a projection of Alice’s identity is another stance in which 
Malabouean trans-subjectivity would be vividly expressed. 
Evading the concept of the other and singling out the notion of alterity 
without transcendence, Alice ponders that ‘being’ could not façade the other; 
yet the other of ‘being’ is within ‘being,’ which makes it transform. Alice thus 
equates ‘being’ with the Malabouean conceptualization of plasticity. Implying 
the plasticity of being, Alice raises a question of “what happens when the sea 
itself plunges away?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 10). If plasticity is, according 
to Malabou, “the capacity to annihilate the very form it is able to receive or cre-
ate” (What Should We Do with Or Brain? 5), the notion of identity could then 
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be understood as resilience because “the formation of each identity is a kind of 
resilience, in other words, a kind of contradictory construction, a synthesis of 
memory and forgetting, of constitution and effacement of forms” (Winterson, 
Gut Symmetries 77). Alice’s view of identity formation coincides with Malabou’s 
outlook in which the plasticity of trans-subjectivation creates a form of pliability 
within. 
Rejecting submission to the culture of compliance, Alice asks herself “what 
would happen if the image smashed the glass?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 
10). The glass shattered by the representation of the object vividly manifests the 
Malabouean notion of the unconscious plasticity, which leads to the formation 
of identity or I. Juxtaposing being and knowing, Alice observes that “we are 
what we know. We know what we are. We reflect our reality. Our reality reflects 
us” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 10). In What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 
Malabou further discusses the massive outcomes of being alert about the plas-
ticity of trans-subjectivation and doing away with flexibility: “to refuse to be 
flexible individuals who combine a permanent control of the self with a capacity 
to self-modify at the whim of fluxes, transfers, and exchanges, for fear of explo-
sion” (What Should We Do with Our Brain? 78). Simply put, knowing could re-
wire being in Gut Symmetries while being or trans-subjectivity is always-already 
contradictory within.  
Endeavoring to bring an end to the conformity, Alice redefines the concepts 
of love, time, subjectivity, and gender. Struggling with being in love with a cou-
ple, Alice attempts to lower her self-controlling guard against the conceptual-
ization of love and affection. Giving the priority to the brain, even in emotional 
issues, Alice confesses that “I don’t own my emotions unless I can think about 
them. I am not afraid of feeling but I am afraid of feeling unthinkably. I don’t 
want to drown. My head is my heart’s lifebelt” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 
14–15). Catherine Malabou also dwells over the point that being aware of the 
plasticity of the brain uncovers “that in a certain sense the brain does not obey 
itself ” (What Should We Do with Our Brain? 79). Malabou adopts an optimistic 
view on the issues of plasticity and trans-subjectivity in reaching biological al-
ter-globalism:
to cancel the fluxes, to lower our self-controlling guard, to accept explod-
ing from time to time: this is what we should do with our brain . . . Perhaps 
we ought to relearn how to enrage ourselves, to explode against a certain 
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culture of docility, of amenity, of the effacement of all conflict even as we 
live in a state of permanent war. (What Should We Do with Our Brain? 79)
Advancing toward self-realization, Alice profoundly experiences herself as a 
gap that observes herself: “If I am so ignorant of my own self, how can I claim 
knowledge of another human being?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 16). Making 
up her mind to re-delineate the established social, cultural and moral concepts, 
Alice terminates the process of being flexible. Resisting flexibility and surviving 
in a “city, an alchemical vessel where dirt and glory do effect transformation” 
(Winterson, Gut Symmetries 15), Alice believes that trans-subjectivation ena-
bles her to repudiate flexibility: “Is it crazy to act crazy in a crazy situation? It 
has logic. It may even have dignity if dignity is what hallmarks the human spirit 
and preserves it. I was not going to sink for him” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 
20). Simply put, apposing flexibility and plasticity, Alice reinforces herself as a 
trans-subject while opposing the defined social structures and values. In the 
concluding chapter of What Should We Do with Our Brain?, Malabou similarly 
claims that
[t]o ask “What should we do with our brain?” is above all to visualize the 
possibility of saying no to an afflicting economic, political, and mediatic 
culture that celebrates only the triumph of flexibility, blessing obedient 
individuals who have no greater merit than that of knowing how to bow 
their heads with a smile. (79)
While Alice depicts the love triangle of Stella, Jove and herself, she presup-
poses that “he was me I was him are we her?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 22) 
and that “the only thing I can claim to own is myself, and look I shall give it to 
you” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 22). If plasticity is the “relation that an indi-
vidual entertains with what, on the one hand, attaches him originally to himself, 
to his proper form, and with what, on the other hand, allows him to launch 
himself into the void of all identity, to abandon all rigid and fixed determina-
tion” (Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain? 80), Alice indicates that 
the connection between the two subjects inside her appears to be unattainable 
as she detects not only a split subjectivity but also two diverse subjects within.
Alice identifies herself as a trans-subject by claiming that “what I see, what I 
touch is interior, either I am inside it or it is inside me . . . It is as though there is 
an entirely other way of being that makes no sense to my world, any more than 
my world makes sense to it. I cannot connect the two” (Winterson, Gut Symme-
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tries 28). Reflecting on the premise that the subjects could not be in command 
of their brain activity and hence their subjectivity, Alice states that “dreams do 
dream us, don’t they? We are not the ones in control” (Winterson, Gut Symme-
tries 28), which confirms the idea of the plasticity of the brain and identity for-
mation in the Malabouean perspective. In the foreword to Malabou’s Plasticity 
at the Dusk of Writing, Clayton Crockett thus maintains that 
[t]he plasticity of the brain is so radical that we create our brains, and 
making a brain is not simply a mechanical or even an organic process. 
We think that our brains make us, forgetting that we also make our brains 
and never glimpsing the possibility of becoming- brain, that is, a pure 
time- image. (xxii)
Projecting the past, the future, and subjectivity as mere images, Alice claims 
that struggling to know oneself encounters one with the fact that one does not 
exist. Being could define itself within the walls of time and due to the fact that 
the past and the future are merely images, what or who one defines himself/
herself as, is sheer nothing. Yet, facing this nothingness, space or rupture within 
paves the ground for experiencing trans-subjectivity: 
I can’t go back into the past and change it, but I have noticed that the 
future changes the past. What I call the past is my memory of it and my 
memory is conditioned by who I am now. Who I will be. The only way for 
me to handle what is happening is to move myself forward into someone 
who has handled it. As yet that person does not exist. (Winterson, Gut 
Symmetries 27)
In other words, the plasticity of identity and the plasticity of time could be 
amalgamated owing to the fact that time could be regarded as plasticity itself. 
Moreover, the essence of presence could limelight the totality of time, which 
is always-already amalgamated with the notion of being. So, if “the spacing of 
temporality is becoming a brain, and the brain is the incarnation of time in a 
body” (Crockett xxii), then “time is plasticity itself, absolute plasticity” (Crock-
ett xxii). Merging temporality and brain, Alice concludes that knowing could be 
the ever-mutable experience of being.
Delving into the concept of knowing, Alice argues that “what you see is 
not what you think you see” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 50), hence it could 
be plausible to consider knowing malleable. Combining the material and the 
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non-material, Alice sees the brain as the material manifestation of temporali-
ty. Additionally, she draws attention to the sexual connotation of the notion of 
knowing, mainly in religious texts. Evincing the plasticity of comprehension, 
Alice implies that knowing could be manifest connection and becoming as “in 
the Torah, the Hebrew ‘to know’, often used in a sexual context, is not about 
facts but about connections. Knowledge, not as accumulation but as charge and 
discharge. A release of energy from one site to another” (Winterson, Gut Sym-
metries 50). Delineating plasticity in matter and non-matter, Alice believes that 
knowing is the pliable process of becoming. Providing an instance from quan-
tum physics, Alice spotlights the plasticity of matter and draws it to the realm of 
consciousness to expound the plasticity of truth.
Explicating the plasticity of electrons, Alice recounts Robert Oppenheimer’s 
stance on electrons and observes that “if we ask whether the position of the 
electron remains the same we must say no. If we ask whether the electron’s posi-
tion changes with time, we must say no. If we ask whether the electron is at rest 
we must say no. If we ask whether it is in motion we must say no” (Winterson, 
Gut Symmetries 50). Paradoxically, the knowledge of the solid fact could make 
its mutability and plasticity certain. Alice even dares raise the question if the 
“truth [is] what we do not know?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 50). Shying away 
from accepting any firm belief as ultimate truth, Alice further poses a question: 
“what is the separateness of things when the current that flows each to each 
is live?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 51). Juxtaposing livingness and plasticity, 
Alice shows that the livingness per se could be defined as the plasticity of being. 
Alice also argues that the identity is not only fragmented but also possibly 
inexistant: “Is identity a deceit? A make-shift, and should we hurry to make any 
pattern we can? Or is there a coherence, perhaps a beauty, if it were possible 
to find it? I would like to convince myself about myself but I cannot . . . I am 
unfrightened by the unexpected” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 69). Seeing her 
identity as a jigsaw, Alice suspects that “there is no picture” (Winterson, Gut 
Symmetries 69) in the jigsaw of ‘being.’ Deeming that identity “cannot be calcu-
lated” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 69), Alice observes that “I should have said 
that whatever the picture is, it will not be the one on the box” (Winterson, Gut 
Symmetries 69). Alice thus asserts that identity could not be predetermined by 
genetics, environment or even nurture. Identity equals the nameless ever al-
tering nothingness, which, in accordance with Catherine Malabou’s notion of 
trans-subjectivity, is an open space between self and self. 
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Proclaiming that her real name is actually Alluvia – “that which is deposited 
by the river” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 71), Alice reckons that the mere route 
to self-realization is through experiencing the empty space between herself and 
herself. Juxtaposing Moses and herself, Alice states: “walk with me. Walk the 
broken past, named and not. Walk the splintered plank, chaos on both sides, 
walk the discovered and what cannot be discovered. Walk the uneasy peace we 
share” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 71). Similar to Moses who split the Nile and 
was rescued, Alice thinks that to be liberated one should explore identity to 
be able to ascertain trans-subjectivity. Observing the other (the beloved), Alice 
presupposes that it equals studying oneself: “this self on self, self as desirer and 
desired, had a frankness to it I had not been invited to discover. Desiring her, I 
felt my own desirability. It was an act of power but not power over her. I was my 
own conquest” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 72). Alice thus monitors herself by 
opposing the other of herself, which is paradoxically herself. Confessing that “I 
sometimes think my personality is a troopship’s atoll; invade me” (Winterson, 
Gut Symmetries 74), Alice sees trans-subjectivity contradictory and wonders 
“would I be the conjuror or the conjured?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 77). For 
that reason, Alice perceives herself as an open space undergoing experiences 
that could be inconsistent and incompatible. 
Portraying herself as a wound, Alice further lime lights that she, as an open 
space or a rupture, has been soaked into love to the extent that she has gone be-
yond love: “If I am a wound would love be my slave?” (Winterson, Gut Symme-
tries 77). Seeing herself as the alchemists’ third element, Alice then puts alche-
my adjacent to identity formation and assumes that the third element could be 
regarded as the ever-opened space within which there are two opposing selves 
whose recognition is the only way to explore one’s identity. As the third person 
in a love triangle, Alice compares her role to a catalyst: “what do the alchemists 
say? . . . The third is not given, whatever it is that reconciles two opposites. If I 
was here to reconcile them were they planning to dump me overboard when the 
job was finished?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 84). Narrating a story within the 
main narration, Alice puts emphasis on the significance of a gap or a crack in 
the process of self-realization. In her narrative of three friends, Alice incessantly 
points out that on their quest they seek “that which cannot be found” (Win-
terson, Gut Symmetries 85). By repeating “‘what is it you seek? ‘That cannot be 
found’” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 86) three times, Alice ultimately concludes 
that “it has found you” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 86). Putting the narration 
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next to the story’s love triangle, Alice asserts that identity could be the ever-al-
terable dialogue between I and I while the third element as a crack observes it. 
It could be concluded that identity as never solid and ever svelte has been 
vividly manifested in Gut Symmetries through the perspectives of the charac-
ters, particularly Alice. In her attempt to define her affection for the couple, 
Alice sees herself as a mere space or crack that consistently observes herself and 
the other of herself. Identifying herself as a rupture, Alice juxtaposes the malle-
ability of quantum physics and trans-subjectivity to assert that presence, time, 
identity, and even being could be nothing other than plasticity or ever-muta-
ble matter and non-matter. Love as both physical and non-physical trigger of 
self-realization paves the ground for spotlighting the plasticity of subjectivation 
or, in Malabouean view, trans-subjectivity.
The Quantum Physics of the Physique: The Plasticity of Corporeality
The present section intends to closely explore the Malabouean concept of 
plasticity in quantum physics and identity formation in Jeanette Winterson’s 
Gut Symmetries. The attempt would be to explore the manifestation of ever-mu-
table identity encountering death, love, sex, and body. Furthermore, masochism 
would be spotlighted as the transformation of sadism toward oneself in order 
to limelight the plasticity of brain and consciousness. The notions of shame and 
guilt would be focused on as associated with the notions of masochism and sad-
ism and hence the plasticity of identity or trans-subjectivation. 
Constantly emphasizing the supremacy of narration in identity formation, 
Alice once more demarcates the boundaries of subjectivation based on the nar-
ration of one about herself/himself: 
Walk with me. Hand in hand through the nightmare of narrative. Need 
to tell a story when no story can be told. Walk the level reassuring floor 
toward the open trapdoor. Plank by plank by to where the sea begins. This 
is a sea story, a wave story, a story that breaks and ebbs, spilling the boat 
up on the beach, dragging it out to a tiny dot. Life assails on its own tears. 
(Winterson, Gut Symmetries 96)
Seeing narration or writing as a gateway to self-realization or trans-subjec-
tivity, Alice presents recounting as healing. Juxtaposing the materiality of writ-
ing and the effects of recounting, Alice observes that the materiality of body and 
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the non-materiality of subjectivation could be in fact the two sides of the same 
coin. To extend it further, Alice claims that being, subjectivation or specifically 
her own identity operate as a gap between herself and other people. She thus 
gives a piece of advice to the reader to “walk the plank. The rough, springy 
underfoot of my emotions. The ‘I’ that I am, subjective, hesitant, goaded from 
behind, afraid of what lies ahead, the drop, the space, the gap between other 
people and myself ” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 96). In accordance with Ma-
labou’s views that identity is as a gap observing the transformation of the self 
and the other of the self, Alice utilizes narration as the digger of the gap more 
profound to the next level:
there is thus a very close relation between the metamorphosis of an iden-
tity that survives with a wound and the story of this metamorphosis—as 
if the plasticity of writing supported that of systems; as if writing itself 
repaired the wound that, as it repairs itself, nourishes writing. (The New 
Wounded 187)
If the self, according to Malabou, consists of the moments of transformation, 
its core has to be temporal. The paradoxical term of ‘temporal core’ thus mani-
fests the plasticity of identity as well as being. Malabou carries on the point that 
identity “is not the expression of unity. Indeed, the ‘self,’ at its very core, is not 
gathered; its manifestation is fundamentally temporal: the self exists only inso-
far as it lasts and produces itself from instant to instant” (The New Wounded 44). 
Such a construction necessarily requires the in-between ruptures that pave the 
ground for trans-subjectivity. 
The importance of the story telling in the construction of trans-subjectivity 
is further emphasized by Antonio Damasio in The Feeling of What Happens: 
[t]he story contained in the images of core consciousness is not told by 
some clever homunculus. Nor is the story really told by you as a self be-
cause the core you is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. 
You exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and 
only then; as long as primordial stories are being told, and only then. You 
are the music while the music lasts. (191)
It could thus be asserted that the brain is the birthplace of the stories in which 
one could comprehend his/her own being. As “the cerebral self represents itself 
without presenting itself ” (Malabou, The New Wounded 44), the parts of the self 
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or identity are always-already hidden. The blurring boundaries of being and 
non-being commence in the brain and in the process of cerebral auto affection, 
which is, according to Catherine Malabou in The New Wounded, “the biolog-
ical, logical, and affective process by which finitude is constituted within the 
living core of subjectivity without ever being able to become the knowledge 
of a subject” (44). As the being could be minimized to mere vibration for Al-
ice, everything, in particular people, is in fact unsolid and floating. Not only 
is subjectivity erratic, but also the physical world could be equally regarded as 
inconsistent and unstable: “the table itself is notional . . . in fact it is a vibration 
as unsolid as ourselves” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 97). Furthermore, Alice 
asserts that due to the plasticity of time, space could be observed as mutable 
and therefore the whole universe could be considered as an ever-transformable 
illusion: 
[a]ccording to quantum theory there are not only second chances but 
multiple chances. Space is simply not connected. History is not unalter-
able. The universe itself is forked. If we knew how to manipulate space-
time as space-time manipulates itself the illusion of our single linear lives 
would collapse. (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 97)
Alice also draws attention to the fact that chance in its core represents the 
concept of plasticity. 
The next point to support our discussion is to be found in Catherine Mala-
bou’s analysis of automaton, a formula that could be deemed equal to plasticity. 
Derived from automatismos, which indicates something that occurs on its own, 
automaton “must be understood in two ways: what happens on its own can do 
so if it bears its own necessity within itself, and what happens on its own can 
also do so, inversely, by pure chance. In this case, contingency is its self-jus-
tification” (Malabou, The New Wounded 136). This is exactly the point of the 
plasticity of corporeality that Alice endeavors to illuminate when she claims that 
the world does not exist, yet it vividly displays the tendency to exist. Juxtaposing 
possibility and practicality, Alice presupposes that
[q]uantum theory states that for every object there is a wave function that 
measures the probability of finding that object at a certain point in space 
and time. Until the measurement is made, the object (particle) exists as a 
sum of all possible states. The difficulty here, between the logical common 
sense world and the complex, maverick universe, is that at a subatomic 
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level, matter does not exist, with certainty, in definite places, rather it has 
a tendency to exist. (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 98)
The tendency to exist or the plasticity of being manifests itself in every aspect 
of life as the process of transformation is, to the extent, similar to the theories in 
quantum physics where everything could be regarded as open space: “if the Su-
perstring theory is correct there is no table. There is no basic building block, no 
firm stable firm principle on which to pile the rest” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 
97). If the soul is merely a “wave function,” then “Hindu mystics put it centuries 
ago, ‘smaller than small, bigger than big’. We are and we are not our bodies” 
(Winterson, Gut Symmetries 98). Merging macrocosm and microcosm, Alice 
concludes that “the entire universe [operates] as a wave function” (Winterson, 
Gut Symmetries 98) believing that the existing and non-existing co-exist. 
Demonstrating the inseparability of the observer and the observed, Alice 
asserts that “if we accept Hawking’s idea that we should treat the entire universe 
as a wave function, both specifically located and infinite, then that function is 
the sum of all possible universes, dead, alive, multiple, simultaneous, interde-
pendent, co-existing” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 98). For Alice, plasticity is 
“the simultaneous absence and presence of matter” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 
102), thus “the sense of who I am, is strengthening and weakening simultane-
ously” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 114). Similarly, even though God has been 
considered the source of life, facing him signifies death: “‘Who shall look on 
God and live?’ To Papa this was the central paradox of his religion, for there is 
no life without God and yet to approach God means death” (Winterson, Gut 
Symmetries 109). The concurrent absence/presence brings about the rupture, 
the crack or the space not only within everything but also of everything as be-
coming or an empty space. 
Putting apprehension and perception vis à vis with each other, Alice clar-
ifies that the “matter has at best a tendency to exist, and will, it seems, divide 
infinitely because there is no there there. There are vibrations, relationships, 
possibilities, and out of these is formed our real life” (Winterson, Gut Symme-
tries 126). Alice further sees plasticity as the “string paradox of the restless and 
the formed” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 126) and claims that “we are neither 
alive nor dead” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 126); hence, consciousness could 
be merely regarded as the observant empty space between the two forms of the 
self. Expanding the notion of plasticity to the plasticity of self and time, Alice 
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hypothesizes that there could be no subjectivity except trans-subjectivity. She 
wonders who she is: maybe just a “temporary imprint in a temporary place. 
Since the beginning of time you and I have been sitting here, talking, listening, 
sliding the bottle between us, but it was not us, or it was some other us, marked 
out, firm for a moment, fading, disappearing, replacing ourselves” (Winterson, 
Gut Symmetries 127). Consequently, Alice interweaves the concept of trans-sub-
jectivation with the notion of concurrent unity and plurality of existence.
Positing the multiplicity and unity of trans-subjectivation, Alice sets forth to 
observe the matter as malleable as trans-subjectivity. She asks: “what do you not 
know that there is in you now, a Caesar, a Raphael, a tear of Mozart, the ended 
bowel problems of Napoleon at Waterloo?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 128). 
Rejecting the belief in any fixed form for/of life: “if life, constantly escaping from 
the forms it inhabits, leaving behind its shell” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 129), 
Alice asserts that life as well as being consists of pliability, which the notion of 
plasticity could reveal the best. That is the reason why Alice decrees that “what 
we are doing does not exist” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 129) and Jove claims 
that “everything possible to be believed is an image of truth” (Winterson, Gut 
Symmetries 130). Convinced that “the most plausible explanations usually are 
lies” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 130), Alice claims that matter, temporality 
and movement are the items that force us to accept the illusion of reality. 
If we consider plasticity and trans-subjectivation as two faces of a coin, it 
could be asserted that producing form from the obliteration of form manifests 
itself not only in matter but also in trans-subjectivity. Uniting history and fu-
turity as present, the open space between history and futurity as the present or 
the rupture between the selves within could be explained through Malabou’s 
notion of plasticity. As consciousness and emotions are inseparable for her, Al-
ice claims that hate and love could be transformable due to the plasticity of both. 
In a chapter entitled “Knave of Coins,” implying the duality of a person in 
Tarot cards, Jove in a manic attack mutilates his wife, Stella, and eats her flesh:
I made the cut so carefully. I made it like a surgeon not a butcher. My 
knife was sharp as a laser. I did it with dignity, hungry though I was. I did 
it so that it would not have disgusted either of us. She was my wife. I was 
her husband. We were one flesh. With my body I thee worship. In sickness 
and in health. For better or for worse. Till death us do part. I parted the 
flesh from the bone and I ate it. (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 119)
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According to Catherine Malabou in The New Wounded, “when sadism ex-
tricates itself from the sexual drive, it seems well-suited to play the role of the 
representative or the phenomenon of the death drive” (190). Sketching the au-
tonomy of death drive, Malabou claims that “if the sadistic drive can, as a partial 
drive, separate from the libidinal drive, it could then bear witness that the death 
drive has a degree of autonomy” (The New Wounded 191). In other words, the 
drive of mastery or destruction could be categorized as the death drive. The 
“fact remains, however, that the figures of such defusion—sadism, destruction, 
mastery, masochism—are all derived from love-hate dyad, from love inverted 
into hate—that is once again, from the intrigue of pleasure” (Malabou, The New 
Wounded 191). Malabou thus makes the death drive visible via her notion of 
destructive plasticity and eventually claims that the concept of destructive plas-
ticity could shed light on the death drive and bestow it its own particular form. 
In “Trauma without a Subject,” Ben Tyrer and Piotrowska elaborate on the 
Malabouean post-traumatic subjectivity and argue that there exists a different 
type of death, which Catherine Malabou “identifies as being precipitated by the 
radical supervention of trauma, a kind where death takes a form of life. For 
those subjects whom she christens ‘the new wounded,’ this is the life of a psy-
che that survives its own destruction” (20). That is to say, the traumatic subject 
could be viewed as a reborn individual whose identity has undergone destruc-
tive plasticity. In Gut Symmetries, surviving her own death Stella juxtaposes be-
ing a victim and a volunteer and asserts that she is able to forgive her husband 
Jove: “I forgive him” (Winterson 131). However, Alice is unable to express the 
mercy as an observer of the suffering and is shocked. 
The next point of our discussion can be related to what Slavoj Žižek in Living 
in the End Times argues:
Is the trauma of which Malabou speaks not a trauma experienced as such 
because it is so unsettling from within the horizon of meaning – in other 
words, is the absence of a meaningful Self traumatic only if we expect its 
presence? If so, then why should we not surmise that . . . once their old 
persona has been erased, they enter a blessed state of indifference and 
only appear to us to be undergoing unbearable suffering? What if les nou-
veaux blesses are literary the new blessed ones? (299)
Winterson has brilliantly narrated this part of the novel within a chapter 
entitled “Judgment,” which connotes rebirth, inner calling, a moment of a deci-
Hoda NikNezHad‐Ferdos, Bakhtiar sadjadi: seekiNg solid suBjectivity versus spottiNg...
144
sion, and judgment without condemnation. Destructive plasticity per se could 
be compared to a type of judgment and decree in which denunciation is ab-
sent. Metaphorically speaking, in the process of plasticity, either a constructive 
or destructive one, the verdict has been declared without any censure. Putting 
emphasis on the role of chance, not only has Winterson entitled each chapter 
according to tarot cards, but she has also narrated each chapter as a type of 
interpretation of that card, thus offering the reader a possibility to analyze the 
entire novel as a sort of card reading. 
Here we have to introduce the concepts of automaton and tuche or tyche, 
which Malabou intertwines with trauma, explaining that tuche could not be 
regarded as a disguise of automaton, yet it could be reflected as its cause. In 
“Trauma without a Subject,” Ben Tyrer and Piotrowska, for example, see the 
Malabouean stance on tuche and automaton as two sides of chance:
[t]uche is not as Malabou asserts the mask of automaton but its cause. 
This doesn’t mean that trauma is effective only to the extent that it reso-
nates with some previous experience (as in the classic Freudian version): 
it is an external shock precisely conceptualized by psychoanalysis. Tuche 
is like destructive plasticity or Freud’s Schreck, a violent unanticipatable 
catastrophe that disrupts the subject; what Malabou theorises (perhaps 
beyond Lacan) is thus a type of tuche that doesn’t simply disturb automa-
ton but irrevocably damages (or destroys) it. (30)
Perceiving tuche as destructive plasticity occurred by chance, Winterson 
presents the automaton as the concealing form of tuche. That is the reason 
why, after the traumatic event of being sliced by her husband, Stella poses the 
question “victim or volunteer?” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 131) twice. As the 
post-traumatic subject, Stella doubts that she could be seen as the volunteer 
for the traumatic event or the prey. In The Anthology of the Accident, Malabou 
claims that “all of a sudden these people become strangers to themselves” (13); 
however, in Winterson’s Gut Symmetries Stella manages to experience a transi-
tion from destructive plasticity to a constructive one due to the existence of a 
feminine figure in her life – Alice. Even though “when damage occurs it is an-
other self who is affected, a new self, unrecognizable” (Malabou, The Anthology 
of the Accident 141), Stella, nevertheless, copes with her trauma because of Alice. 
In an interview for JCRT by Pena, Catherine Malabou argues that “there is 
no ‘essence’ of femininity” (3) and asserts that she “will refer to Irigaray again on 
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this point: woman neither is nor has an essence” (4). The notion of femininity 
in Winterson’s Gut Symmetries entirely embraces the notion of plasticity as it is 
based on Irigaray’s view of femininity: “she does not set herself up as one, as a 
(single) female unit. She is not closed up or around one single truth or essence. 
The essence of a truth remains foreign to her. She neither has nor is a being” 
(Irigaray 86). The feminine could not be precisely depicted in Winterson’s Gut 
Symmetries as it does away with any essentialism in the female characters. For 
instance, Alice serves as a trans-subject who has an affair with both Stella and 
Jove; yet she is unable to label herself as a woman. 
It could be noticed that essenceless-ness does not signify neutrality: “woman 
has no essence, but that doesn’t mean that woman is neutral either” (Malabou, 
“The Meaning of Femininity” 4). Relatedly, Alice puts emphasis on the form and 
physique of Stella and Jove as a particularity of their being and does not express 
the binary opposition of male/female: “Wave function of life scattered down to 
one dear face. How else can I know you but through the body you rent? Forgive 
me if I love it too much” (Winterson, Gut Symmetries 132). Accentuating the 
significance of body regardless of its gender, Stella as well as Alice succeeds in 
transforming her destructive plasticity into a constructive one, which reflects 
Malabou’s view that she does
not intend to show that these modes of being of the subject represent the 
masculine/feminine relationship. I am interested in showing that this re-
lationship between form and itself is not founded on a difference. The two 
modes of being of the subject are not different from one another, but each 
of them transforms itself into the other. With plasticity, we are not facing 
a pre-given difference, but a process of metamorphosis. In other words, 
the Hegelian subjects trans-subjects itself constantly. Its form is its matter. 
(What Should We Do with Our Brain? 4)
The feminine body as indescribable reveals itself beyond expression and so-
lidity. The plasticity of femininity as an emancipatory route for a trans-subject 
imposes itself in every fraction of Winterson’s Gut Symmetries.  
It could be concluded that the plasticity of matter has been presented as con-
structive and destructive in Gut Symmetries. Plasticity as the mere core of life, 
being, identity, and love manifests itself in the form of trans-subjectivity. Sad-
ism as the destructive plasticity illustrates the form of death drive in the novel 
and it expresses the plasticity of love that could be transformed into hate. The 
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paradoxical notion of God was put adjacent to plasticity in such a way that ap-
proaching God as the source of life equals death in the characters’ stance. The 
plasticity of femininity as an emancipator of the trans-subjects expresses itself in 
Stella’s and Alice’s bond to limelight femininity as essenceless, yet not impartial 
Conclusion
As a never-unyielding and ever-erratic phenomenon, identity has been ex-
plicated in Gut Symmetries through the perspectives of the characters, in par-
ticular Alice. In an effort to identify her affection for the couple, Alice comes 
across herself as a mere space or fracture that constantly observes herself and 
the other of herself. Identifying herself as a rupture, Alice juxtaposes the pliabil-
ity of quantum physics and trans-subjectivity to emphasize that presence, time, 
identity, and even being could be nothing other than plasticity or ever-muta-
ble matter and non-matter. Love as both physical and non-physical trigger of 
self-realization paves the ground for highlighting the plasticity of subjectivation 
or, in Malabouean terms, trans-subjectivity. The plasticity of substance has been 
shown as the constructive and destructive one in Gut Symmetries. Plasticity as 
the sheer nucleus of existence, identity, and love makes itself perceptible in the 
form of trans-subjectivity. Sadism as the destructive plasticity exemplifies the 
form of death drive in the novel and it confirms the plasticity of love, which 
could be transformed into hate. The contradictory notion of God was put adja-
cent to plasticity in such a way that going within reach of God as the source of 
life is equivalent to death in the characters’ stance. Moreover, Stella manages to 
transform her destructive plasticity into a constructive one due to the medium 
of femininity and feminine body of Alice. Spotlighting femininity essenceless, 
Alice and Stella represent femininity as mutable and erratic. Shying away from 
neutrality, the feminine characters of the novel limelight the plasticity of femi-
ninity and the feminine.
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POTRAGA ZA PRAVOM SUBJEKTIVNOŠĆU NASUPROT 
OTKRIVANJU TRANSSUBJEKTIVIZACIJE U ROMANU 
GUT SyMMETRIES JEANETTE WINTERSON
Sažetak
Hoda NIKNEZHAD‐FERDOS 
Islamsko sveučilište Azad 
Središnja podružnica u Teheranu








Rad pomno istražuje proces oblikovanja identiteta u likovima romana Gut Symmetries 
spisateljice Jeanette Winterson sljedećim pojmovima Catherine Malabou: plastičnost, 
destruktivna plastičnost ili trauma te transsubjektivacija. Identitet kao nedosljedan pro-
ces postajanja u romanu se analizira kroz perspektivu likova, posebice Alice. Identitet 
kao puki prostor ili pukotinu, koji subjektu pruža trajnu mogućnost da sam sebe pro-
matra, moguće je predstaviti kao Malabouin pojam plastičnosti subjektivnosti ili tran-
ssubjektivacije. Pritom se u odnos dovode podatnost kvantne fizike te transsubjektiv-
nosti s ciljem isticanja kako prisutnost, vrijeme, identitet, pa čak i biće, nisu ništa drugo 
doli plastičnosti ili neprestano fluktuirajuće (ne)materije. Plastičnost kao apsolutna srž 
postojanja, identiteta i ljubavi očituje se kroz transsubjektivnost. Sadizam kao oblik de-
struktivne plastičnosti ističe se u romanu kao smrtonosni nagon i potvrđuje plastičnost 
ljubavi, otvorene za pretvorbu u mržnju. Ističući ženstvenost kao odsutnost suštine, 
Alice i Stella donose se kao primjeri promjenjive i nestalne ženstvenosti.
Ključne riječi: tjelesnost, destruktivna plastičnost (trauma), plastičnost, sadizam, vrije-
me, transsubjektivacija, Jeanette Winterson, Gut Symmetries
